The Emergence and Erosion of Criminal Defense in the United States

The Emergence of Public Defense and Immediate Onset of its Failure

Clarence Earl Gideon stood shaky-kneed and jumbled his words as he represented himself in a Florida court (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002).  His felony theft accusations stemmed from witnesses who were sure that he was the one responsible for the destruction of property and thievery (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002).  At this time in the United States’ history, criminal defense was provided on an ad hoc basis and the authority to do so was solely vested in the power of the presiding judges – which, at times, was not able to be done because of procedural laws (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002).  The lack of legal training, previous life experiences, and age of Mr. Gideon contributed to his five-year prison sentence for the above-mentioned accusations (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002).  As his prison sentenced commenced, his only option was to, again, represent himself in appellate matters, which are more extensive and detailed than initial criminal court matters (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002).  Mr. Gideon was smart enough to know this, and thus began to study the American legal system while incarcerated (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002). 

Because the state appellate courts all agreed with the lower courts due to procedural laws, Mr. Gideon had to pursue justice in the federal system and raise constitutional issues that are presented in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002).  The Supreme Court at this period in American history was dealing with serious civil liberties and mostly configured liberal reforms across the United States.  More specifically, the Warren Court – named after Chief Justice Earl Warren – was concerned about maintaining public integrity in the justice system and the core values that the United States was founded upon during these times of civil unrest.  It was not luck for sure, but Mr. Gideon found himself in the right era and used his self-taught legal education to address the problem of self-representation in criminal courts in the United States to the Supreme Court.

            Rumination by the nine justices in the Gideon case took approximately three months, and the decision by the Supreme Court forced an evolution in the United States that was thought to be not only necessary, but proper because of the traditions that are found within the country’s history and Constitution (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002).  That is, the right to a fair legal proceeding had changed to the understanding that the term “fair” included having proper legal representation when one is facing criminal charges (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002).  The Supreme Court’s soliloquy about the Gideon decision delivered positive thoughts about the criminal justice system throughout the country for many people, as it was considered to be landmark in due process rights and something that everyone could benefit from (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002).  Shortly after the decision, states were required to augment their procedural laws and fund defense systems for indigent criminal defendants (Lewis, 1964; Pyle, 2002). 

Because of this, many dissenting state parties attempted to uproot the federal mandate through economic means and hiring procedures (Lewis, 1964; Metzger, 2013; Pyle, 2002).  Almost immediately after the Gideon decision the deception in public defense began to be circumvented by the above-mentioned opposed parties (Lewis, 1964; Metzger, 2006, 2013).  State governors in liberal states participated in these actions as well, but hid behind budget concerns rather than outright disdain about providing effective counsel to poor criminal defendants (Lewis, 1964; Metzger, 2006, 2013).  The Gideon decision was supposed to add more merit to being fair and impartial and being innocent until proven guilty in the American courts; however, with the political and professional discourse by prosecutors and law enforcers the public defense systems were haphazardly crafted and, again, the decision by the Supreme Court did not impose any regulations about what is considered to be effective counsel (Farole & Langton, 2010; Metzger, 2006, 2013).  In other words, the Gideon decision by the Supreme Court did bring beneficial practices to the criminal justice system in the United States, yet the lack of standards and sovereignty of the states allowed the order to not hold as much weight as it was intended to have (Farole & Langton, 2010; Metzger, 2006, 2013).  Essentially, the effectiveness of the criminal defense mandate for indigent defendants was never properly established in the United States. 

Implementation of Conservative Crime Control as a Major Factor in Eroding Public Defense

            

              As aforementioned, the Gideon decision by the Supreme Court was performed during an era when the legal system was being challenged by American citizens through street-level protestations and other social justice-based forums (Gaines & Miller, 2004; Kennedy, 2011; Powe, 2000).  The jurisprudence changed dramatically during the early 1970s as the Republicans came to power in the federal government.  Meaning that the typical conservative interpretation of crime control through political campaigns spearheaded the erosion of public defense in the criminal justice system (Powe, 2000; Weiner, 2016).  More specifically, the liberal agendas were used as a platform to suggest that crime rates were rising because of the focus on due process rights and not strict crime control methods (Powe, 2000; Walker, 2011; Weiner, 2016).  The public-criminal defense system was rarely suggested to be the causation of such claims, yet it was targeted through budget concerns by conservative Republicans to manifest the notion that crime control was occurring, and that if an individual was arrested that they would receive justice so that deterrence for criminality occurred (Powe, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2013; Walker, 2011; Weiner, 2016).  At this point, the allocation of monies to state and federal public defense offices began to decline and the concept within the Gideon decision became less-and-less meaningful to judicial districts, the public, and state politicians all throughout the United States. 

Moreover, as the Nixon administration espoused the idea of tough on crime policies and used the violent crime rates to retain public office in the early 1970s, public defenders were simultaneously being overwhelmed with cases that they could not give a sufficient amount of attention to in order to present claims of violations of constitutional rights in law enforcement procedures (Powe, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2013; Walker, 2011; Weiner, 2016).  These actions not only began the erosion of public-criminal defense in a more detailed manner, but also set the tone for the mass incarceration that is currently ongoing (Powe, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2013; Walker, 2011; Weiner, 2016).  Additionally, it should be noted that this was deliberately being done by lawmakers so that their claims of fighting crime could be verified.  Other conservativeness was responsible for the dwindling of public-legal defense too.  To elaborate further, as the Gideon decision radiated across the United States there was a common claim that inferred that public defender offices should not receive monies because of other societal concerns and that criminals should not be wasting tax payers’ dollars on courtroom procedures (Powe, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2013; Walker, 2011; Weiner, 2016).  These suggestions and claims turned due process in the American courts into a method that said that criminal defendants were mostly guilty and did not deserve the treatment that is construed in the Bill of Rights (Powe, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2013; Walker, 2011; Weiner, 2016). 

1980s and 1990s and the Complete Destruction of Public Criminal Defense

Once more, tough on crime policies emerged and the politicians in the 1980s eroded more of the constitutional rights that were conveyed during the Warren Court and its decision in the Gideon case.  The War on Drugs had officially been set in place and the Reagan and Bush administrations made sure that they were going to not look bad when they spoke about criminal justice policies (Mallea, 2014; Walker, 2011).  These federal demonstrations of criminal justice administration gave the state systems and state lawmakers the energy to allocate monies to different areas in their budgets and be justified in doing so (Carlson & Garrett, 1999; Mallea, 2014; Reiman & Leighton, 2013).  Guilty pleas and incarceration rates were rising steadily, and throughout the United States indigent criminal defendants were routinely denied any reasonable due process in every type of criminal court (Alexander, 2011; Reiman & Leighton, 2013).  In addition to this, being a public defender was something that was now considered to be ashamed of in the legal field, and the lawyers who worked in public defense offices were known for their inexperience, collaboration with prosecutors and judges, and viewed as negotiators for the legal system so that the assembly line of justice that was created could be carried out (Beckett & Sasson, 2004; Mallea, 2014). 

The 1990s was saturated with more policies and tactics that destroyed the legal defense system for indigent defendants (Alexander, 2011; Metzger, 2006; Reiman & Leighton, 2013; Walker, 2011).  Specifically, mass incarceration was in full bloom and the public defenders in the United States were no longer hiding behind claims of insufficient expenditures or lack of experience in their offices (Metzger, 2006; Reiman & Leighton, 2013).  It was during this decade that public-legal defense became blatantly synonymous with being a position that worked closely with prosecutors and judges to acquire as many convictions as possible (Davis, 2007; Farole & Langton, 2012; Metzger, 2006).  Trials were now considered to be costly and unnecessary, and if a poor defendant flexed their constitutional rights they were threatened with more severe punishments and dealt with the abuse of power from the practitioners who work in the criminal justice system (Davis, 2007; Farole & Langton, 2012; Metzger, 2006).  Basically, public defenders in the United States became part of law enforcement during this era, and they participated in actions that ensured that police officers, judges, prosecutors, and corrections employees all had stable employment and that criminal defendants did not tie up the system (Alexander, 2011; Davis, 2007; Heiner, 2015). 

Moreover, these unconstitutional activities were considered necessary because of the massive numbers of people entering the system.  In other words, if the public defenders did not participate in ensuring convictions without a trial the criminal justice system in the United States would never be able to operate given its current structure (Alexander, 2011; Heiner, 2015; McCoy, 2005).  Simply put, assembly line justice and abuses of powers were created because if the millions of criminal defendants all invoked their constitutional rights to a trial the police departments, courtrooms, and correctional facilities would have to stop their routine practices (Heiner, 2015; McCoy, 2005).  Arrests and correctional facility admissions would have to be ceased if indigent defendants utilized their constitutional rights to a trial by jury in other words (Heiner, 2015, McCoy, 2005).  

    

Current Practices of Public Legal Defense

The current premises of the public defenders in the United States has little to do with properly representing indigent defendants (Alexander, 2011; Fisher, 2003; Heiner, 2005; McCoy, 2005).  As mentioned above, the majority of the practices of public defense offices includes ensuring that police departments, prosecutors, judges, and correctional facility employees have constant processing work (Fisher, 2003; Heiner, 2015; McCoy, 2005).  Little effort is made by the legal system to produce adequate criminal defense for poor criminal defense these days (Fisher, 2003; Heiner, 2015; McCoy, 2005; Stith & Cabranes, 1998).  Second to this, public defenders maintain connections with law enforcers to retain rank, credibility, and economic and professional mobility (Heiner, 2015; McCoy, 2005; Stith & Cabranes, 1998).  Many public defenders use their positions to acquire better employment opportunities with the state and federal governments and private law firms that offer better salaries and benefits.  Mass incarceration and the lack of trials by jury speak for themselves, and the trend of botching the Gideon decision seems to not be slowing down (Fisher, 2003; Heiner, 2015; McCoy, 2005; Stith & Cabranes, 1998).   

References

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