The Contemporary Philosophy of Law and the Epoch of Commerce Infused Justice in the United States
Prolegomenon
Ingratiating concepts of
criminal justice has been interrelated with commercial practices in the United
States because of the capitalistic endeavors that are commonly accepted and
abundant in the nation (Black, 2010; Church & Heumann, 1992; Horton &
Platt, 1986; Lipsky, 2010). Because of
this, citizens and legal practitioners have accepted the biases and
miscarriages of justice without comprehending the significant social issues
that are caused because of the relationship between legal processes and
commerce. That is, routine commerce has infused
decisions that are made on maintaining employment and business services to the
criminal justice system (Chiricos & Delone, 1992; Wenzelburger, 2017). These decision-making processes are exhibited
by lawmakers and law enforcement officers when policies are created and
enforced in contemporary society.
Criminal laws, and the
enforcement of them, provides and sustains desired goals in a specific and
general fashion (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010).
Society receives benefits and individual success is also attained in
other words. Having such an embedded
philosophy of law delivers astern-based assimilation to poor administrations of
justice and, in turn, stunts the evolution of the criminal justice system in
the United States (Black, 2010; Church & Heumann, 1992; Horton & Platt,
1986; Lipsky, 2010). Contemporary
understandings of criminal justice policies in the country are based on these
stunted methodologies. Criminal justice
in the United States is, essentially, based on business ideas and practices and
not a full-fledged understanding of facts or behaviors that are deemed as
inappropriate by popular demand (Bohm, 2006; Feeley & Simon, 1994). Thus, this essay presents a stoic analysis of
the criminal justice system and how it relates to private sector business
practices.
Contemporary
Philosophy of Law and Commercial Expectations
Business
mentalities are the primary objectives in contemporary criminal justice (Bohm,
2006; Feeley & Simon, 1994; Ritzer, 2004).
Defining modern criminal legal practices is a difficult concept, but
abhorrent practices easily mark the beginning of such a term. That is, the shift toward harsh penalties for
non-violent criminality, the commencement of mandatory minimum and consecutive
sentences, initiating and sustaining mass incarceration, the surge of
documented police brutality, due process violations in the courts, and the
large parameters of hiring processes for law enforcers all make for a valid
interpretation of the beginning of a new philosophy toward criminal justice in
the United States. An exact date is
impossible to produce, but the 1980s surely encompass behaviors that can be
identified as a transition that mark conventional understandings of criminal
justice into a system that is based on business mentalities (Baum, 1996;
Sessions, 2012). Since this decade, the hefty
amount of biased legal work is exorbitant and the practitioners in the field
have streamlined botched justice in order to sustain the decisions and
activities that have allowed for the prejudices to ensue (Baum, 1996; Bohm,
2006; Feeley & Simon, 1994; Ritzer, 2004).
A self-produced sense of
righteousness by the legal practitioners, and others who associate themselves
with the criminal justice system, is one of the reasons that this philosophy of
law has been maintained. An example of
this can be noticed with the advertising schemes that have manifested since the
business mind frames came to power. Such
as, lawmakers and law enforcers claiming that specific policies are necessary
without much factual content to backup their claims and private companies also
backing the claims and coming to the rescue to provide a host of beneficial
services (Hill & Marion, 2018; Huber & Gordon, 2004). This example shows how direct relationships
with the criminal justice system by private companies is partially responsible
for the flux of business perceptions that have caused the current prospects of
the legal practitioners (Fitzgibbon & Lea, 2017; Maguire, 2012). Indirect relationships occur because of this and also serve as an
example of the transition to business practices overrunning the criminal
justice system. That is, the emergence
of private services outside of private prisons is exorbitant. Consultants, security companies, technology
companies, textile services, and transportation services are the primary
services that contribute to the solidified business practices in the criminal
justice system in modern times and have created a web of industry that would cause serious harm to the economy if it was broken up (Fitzgibbon & Lea, 2017; Maguire, 2012).
Because
of the above-mentioned transition to business-minded legal practices, the
practitioners make explicit and implicit decisions based on the host of
services and not facts that are pertinent to the best interest of justice (Fitzgibbon
& Lea, 2017; Maguire, 2012). Lawmakers
will support bills for monetary reasons and to acquire popularity with large
bodies of potential voters, police officers perform arrests and investigations
because of the advent of technology and reliance on other services for
professionalism, judges and prosecutors will adhere to efficiency policies that
are found in business practices to acquire the fastest revenue and turnover for
the criminal justice system, correction people unionize and use safety concerns and the implementation of incarceration as justification for their worth, and private companies will produce updated
services that allow for the constant making of justice that allows their
services to prosper and, in turn, allows the legal practitioners to thrive as
professionals in their chosen career path (Black, 2010; Fitzgibbon & Lea,
2017; Lipsky, 2010; Maguire, 2012). All
of these behaviors have, unfortunately, become common trains of thought in
citizens’ minds as well or simply expected because of the long-lasting trend in
these endeavors (Black, 2010; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Witschge, 2014). More specifically, the business mentalities
that have surfaced in the criminal justice system are considered to be ordinary
because of the plethora of phony public service that has become the norm, the
expected lies by lawmakers and law enforcers, political donations by large
private entities and political action committees, as well as the obvious
catering to wealth and social statuses in the political and legal arenas in the
United States (Black, 2010; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Lipsky, 2010; Witschge,
2014). Contemporary philosophies of law
are based on capitalistic schemes and personas that are desired because of the
engagement in business transactions and services, that is (Arjoon, 2000; Peterson
& Jun, 2009; Zimring & Johnson, 2006).
Public service in the criminal justice system in our current society is
based on ideations that allow for abuses of power and social statuses that can
be understood as pragmatic corruption (Arjoon, 2000; Peterson & Jun, 2007;
Zimring & Johnson, 2006).
Conveyances about fair and accurate criminal justice practices are not expected by the
professionals and citizens when an unbiased observation of their behaviors and
responses to legal activities is undergone (Arjoon, 2000; Barker, 2006;
Peterson & Jun, 2007; Zimring & Johnson, 2006). This is especially true for socioeconomic and
racial and ethnic minorities in the United States (Giddens, 1973; Reiman &
Leighton, 2017). Furthermore, it should
be noted that socioeconomic minorities does not only include the typical version
of indigent people with low or no incomes.
Explaining more, civilians who do not have significant wealth or
resources mostly fall into this category of lethargy that scarcely presents disagreement
about criminal justice practices, and also serve as an illustration of how the
low expectations is something that is normal in contemporary society (Giddens, 1973; Reiman &
Leighton, 2017). Public polls and media
endeavors validate this claim, and the lack of attention toward these decisions
of the public by lawmakers and law enforcers is also an example of low
expectations of proper justice and how it is also considered to be normal by the
administrators of justice, and also confirms how augmentations that would bring
sincere justice is unwanted by the direct and indirect professionals involved
with the criminal justice system (ACLU, 2017; Gotoff & Lake, 2018; Reiman
& Leighton, 2017). Reforms are expressed by citizens at times, but there are barely any actions by the public or practitioners that initiate any significant changes in the criminal justice system in other words.
The
concept of contemporary commercialism has turned the criminal justice system
into a system that is corrupted at its core.
Violations in due process and constitutional provisions are example of
this and can be seen in flagrant internal policies and laws that allow law
enforcers to be hypocrites in their professionalism. Mass surveillance, mass incarceration, high
conviction rates, denying criminal defendants' rights to acquire evidence,
freedom of speech intrusions, prosecutors abusing their power and deliberately
stacking criminal charges or using severe punishments to acquire conviction,
court clerks adhering to the lousy requests of corrupted judges and attorneys,
large budgets for criminal justice organizations, snitch work, bribe taking,
dismissals of police and correction officer negligence in grand juries and
courts, prosecutors becoming judges, lazy and inept appeals courts, political
appointments, and the hiring and re-hiring of incompetent persons as criminal
justice practitioners are all examples of these corruption practices that have
been engraved in contemporary American society (Kraska & Brent, 2011;
Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Schneier, 2018; Shantz, 2012). Once more, the behaviors are expected by
legal practitioners and the public and there are no significant efforts undergone
to change the lethargic and biased practices in the criminal justice
system. Street-level protests, lawsuits, town hall meetings, and the work of non-profit or watchdog organizations barely infiltrate
the corruption in the criminal justice system with much success because of the
stronghold and normalcy of the current perverted philosophy of law.
Bureaucracy is also
fueling the contemporary philosophy of law for citizens and criminal justice
professionals, as well as the associated commercialism (Black, 2010; Lipsky,
2010; Shantz, 2012). That is, large and
complex forms of regulations are distributing misinterpretations of
professionalism and legal procedures, and confusing individuals to the
objectives of criminal justice in the United States (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010;
Shantz, 2012). This is a two-part
understanding. First, the massive
implementation of regulation in the criminal justice system causes
practitioners to narrow in on specific concentrations without learning the core
values in the legal system and allows for commerce-based decisions to
thrive. Second, the complexity and
massive number of regulations posits to individuals that these processes are
law and, in many cases, become law because of these misunderstandings of
internal policies for individuals or particular organizations. As aforementioned, this is a commercial
understanding of justice. Business
practices are known to disperse internal rules for their customers and
employees and simultaneously forget about laws and constitutional provisions
that are supposed to guide their decisions.
If the efficiency of business practices is hindered, then the
regulations evolve to meet the standards of environmental conditions that allow
for the most profit and fastest way to restore the productivity of business
(Bohm, 2006; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz, 2012).
The criminal justice system does this with activities that include
disenfranchising the poor, segregating the racial and ethnic minorities, lack
of trials, quotas, budget increases, and evolution in laws that allow for quicker forms
of adjudication (Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Shantz, 2012). In contrast, and for example purposes, the
regulation also gives the previously mentioned lethargic expectations of
justice in the United States merit, which in turn makes challenges to the
status quo of justice difficult to disrupt.
Case in point, if the expenditures of justice are impacted by the wait
time for reaching the desired quick goals of prosecution, then the criminal
justice practitioners tend to pursue easier efforts that do allow for quick
finalization of legal processes (Black, 2010; Bohm, 2006; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz,
2012). Conjuring and invoking internal regulations is one of those methods and the public accepts the practices because of the authority that legal agencies have in society.
Police
Officers, Lawyers, and Correction Officers:
Conduits of Capitalism
Salesmen
are individuals who present information about business services in order to
retain money and high values of products so that more money is made. The core criminal justice practitioners have
similar tendencies, and many of the practitioners perform advocacy work for the
business practices of private corporations, as well as the public institutions
that they work for in a direct and indirect fashion (Kraska & Brent, 2011;
Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). At times,
many of the aforementioned professionals perform sales services for private
companies without even knowing that they are doing so. For example, police officers routinely embark
on law enforcement processes in neighborhoods because of criminal activity that
arises or is called in to police stations or other instances of quality-of-life
circumstances. Moreover, as police
officers enter these situations and use their tactical gear, vehicles, and
other devices -- via private companies that specialize in creating and selling
these utilities – they are indirectly supporting the business services and
capitalism that is associated with the criminal justice system (Bailey, 1998;
Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). This is also
done during training procedures for police officers. Thus, an argument can be made that the more
private utilities that are used by police officers during encounters with
citizens or during training procedures can be deemed as a justification to use
the utilities more often, inform themselves of the utilities’ worthiness, and keep
the status quo of the current commercial-based philosophy of law ongoing. Private services in these daily meetings
therefore shape the criminal justice system in an indirect fashion (Bailey,
1998; Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). If the private services were discontinued it
would be impossible to fully engage in the current type of police work in the
United States.
Investigations
by police officers serve as a better example of the commercialism and
expectations of justice in our current society and are also interrelated to the
business mentalities of the professionals in the additional parts of the
criminal justice system. Explaining
further, clandestine operations and non-undercover investigations by police
officers all include the use of corporate services (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010;
Bohm, 2006; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). Computer systems, forms, electronic
surveillance equipment, contacting other law enforcers and issuing subpoenas to
private establishments, and the meetings that ensue between other law
enforcement officials and laypeople all exhibit the corporate mentalities
within the criminal justice system (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010;
Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). Although the
communications and use of services are unavoidable and necessary at times, the
fact is the many of the above-mentioned processes are similar tendencies found
in the private sector. Success in police
business is conveyed through arrests and convictions and the more often it happens
then the practitioners can claim to be more successful at their daily agendas
and professions (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz, 2012; Skoll,
2009). Similar networking and goal retention is seen in the private sector. Corporations will contract or buy services from other businesses, schedule conference calls and meetings, and use the communication processes to ensure that their business service is considered satisfactory and successful.
Police officers and departments
view the money, time, and effort spent on interactions with the public in ratio
formats (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). For example, the services that police
officers utilize and amount of effort put into a call for assistance or during
investigations is based on the outcome that can be attained (Bailey, 1998;
Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). Police officers are known to not arrest
people or deal with specific situations if suspects or citizens have particular
social statuses, wealth, or are able to use resources that can discredit their
police work (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz, 2012; Skoll,
2009). Lastly, and for example purposes,
the longer an investigation takes the bigger outcome – punishment – is expected
by police officers and police departments.
Case in point, the rate of effort to outcome/rewards guides police
officers’ behaviors just like business people in the private sector (Bailey,
1998; Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Shantz, 2012;
Skoll, 2009). If a company creates a
product or service and it is not yielding expected profits then the company
will most likely discontinue the product or services and move on to a more
rewarding business practice.
Prosecutors,
judges, and criminal defense attorneys participate in similar discourses as
police officers when their behaviors are fully examined as well. More precisely, prosecutors gauge their
success on conviction rates and severity of sentences that are acquired, which
is a selfish understanding of what qualities of justice entail (Bailey, 1998;
Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Shantz, 2012; Skoll,
2009). This approach toward law
enforcement and criminal justice in general is similar to for-profit marketing
schemes and enhancing social reputations in the business world (Bailey, 1998;
Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Shantz, 2012; Skoll,
2009). Private companies base their
success on their quarterly earnings and likings of their services by their
patrons/customers and discuss the matters with their associates in order to
continue the defined success. The
structure of prosecutor offices in the nation serve as a demonstration of how
business practices and administrations of criminal justice are parallel to each
other. That is, district attorneys have
similar roles as corporate executive officers in the private sector and their
perceived roles of success are based on the conviction-to-no conviction rate/ratio
as well as the public imagery that is delivered because of the aforementioned
understanding of success via the conviction-non-conviction ratio (Bailey, 1998;
Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Shantz, 2012; Skoll,
2009). There is even a top-down approach
and top-level prosecutors instruct assistant district attorneys to engage in
specific forms of prosecutions, criminal charging, and trial strategies to
uphold the desired reputation of district attorneys and their public image
desires (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017;
Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). Which is
similar to business practices in the private sector; such as developing a team
that is on board with company goals that are conveyed by the top-level
supervisors for financial and social prosperity.
Moreover, top-level
prosecutors base their concentrations on popular issues in society. In other words, when there is a media frenzy
or social uprising about specific criminality, then prosecutors take advantage
of the social cries and use them to their advantage (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010;
Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). This is seen with issues such as the opioid
epidemic, crack-cocaine epidemic, terrorism, frauds in well-liked organizations
by insiders, and cases that involve children and senior citizen victims. In contrast, prosecutors’ offices will also initiate
criminal proceedings against a group or individual because of the social dissent
against a specific behavior while knowing that the charges or indictments will
not hold their weight (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman &
Leighton, 2017; Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009).
This is the previously mentioned public relation efforts and is
typically seen in cases brought against other law enforcers or wealthy
defendants that result in either minor charges or dismissals. For comparison reasons, businesses will cater
to social demands and create products and advertisements to enhance their
profits and professional reputations and deem any fallacies by consumers or competitors
as frivolous or not as significant as others are making the problems out to be.
Judges
are unique in their commercialistic behaviors.
The above-mentioned top-down decision-making processes are seen through
the structure of the American court system, with the Supreme Court jurists
acting as a board of governors who make decisions that must be adhered to by
lower courts, additional law enforcers, and civilians (Bailey, 1998; Black,
2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009). This massive structure of interrelated state
and federal courts performs in a manner that is similar to an international conglomerate. Particularly, the court structure in the
United States is made of many divisions that have specializations and judges
serve as district leaders for the smaller branches of justice that fall in line
with the decisions made by higher courts.
The lower court judges have some discretion, but most of their decisions
are based on laws and stare decisis procedures (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010; Kraska
& Brent, 2011; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Shantz, 2012;
Skoll, 2009). Of this, the discussion of
lawmakers not being as influential as the Supreme Court is needed, as their (lawmakers) policies that are enacted only produce the guidelines for law enforcers and can
be uprooted by a majority vote in the Supreme Court or even by the other
jurists in the lower courts in the country.
Lawmakers are, essentially, similar to corporate attorneys or human
relations departments in the private sector.
Their actions serve as advice on policies and public relations efforts
for judges, that is. Still, judges, and
especially the Supreme Court, have the final say in what is legal and illegal. Judges manage adherence to the law during
investigations and prosecutions in other words, and are able to make lawmakers
and other law enforcers incorrect in their behaviors without much impact on
their professionalism and desired social reputations (Bailey, 1998; Black,
2010; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017;
Shantz, 2012; Skoll, 2009).
Criminal defense is the
most obvious of the lawyer group that bases its entire professionalism on
business practices. Of the two types of
criminal defense attorneys – public and privately retained criminal defense
attorneys – private sector criminal defense attorneys take cases based on the
money that a defendant is able to pay and, in turn, provide defense in courts
based on this monetary sum. The severity
of the charges and type of court system has a significant influence on the fees
that private criminal defense attorneys charge (Bailey, 1998; Black, 2010;
Kraska & Brent, 2011; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Shantz,
2012; Skoll, 2009). This shows how
justice – according to the non-public criminal defense lawyers – is based on
monetary profits and that due process occurs based on business practices (Bohm,
2006; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).
Regarding public criminal defense attorneys, their professionalism is
viewed as derogatory when compared to criminal defense attorneys in the private
sector. Social stratification takes
shape because of capitalism in other words, and public defense attorney work is
considered to be not only one of the lowest forms of legal work in the criminal
justice system, but also training for fresh attorneys out of law school (Bohm, 2006; Rattner, Turjeman, Fishman, 2008; Reiman
& Leighton, 2017). Moreover,
when public criminal defense attorneys are diligent in their services to indigent
defendants other players in the legal system engage in activities to hinder
effective counsel (Bohm, 2006; Rattner, Turjeman, Fishman, 2008; Reiman &
Leighton, 2017). This is seen with
denials of motions, offering their clients favorable deals to acquire
convictions, bombarding public defense offices with large caseloads, and
mocking public defenders so that their clients do not think that they are
receiving proper representation (Bohm, 2006; Rattner, Turjeman, Fishman, 2008;
Reiman & Leighton, 2017). When all
of these retaliatory behaviors are observed, it is apparent that a money driven
system destroys the fundamental right of representation that is described in
the Sixth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.
Lastly, criminal defendants who are unable to hire a criminal defense
attorney are typically treated differently when compared to accused offenders
who can (Bohm, 2006; Rattner, Turjeman, Fishman, 2008; Reiman & Leighton,
2017). Once more, this is another example
of how the criminal justice system’s activities are monetized and infused with
commercialism in the United States because of social class systems that are
based on capitalism.
Turning
to the business behaviors and mentalities of corrections personnel, these
practitioners have the same reliance on private services as the police officers
in the United States. Albeit, the
correction people in the United States have a heavier reliance on private
services when compared to police officers and other forms of law
enforcers. In sum, the entire
conventional and community correctional profession is saturated with private
services that assist these professionals and, in turn, maintain the status quo
of mass incarceration and the contemporary practices of the criminal justice
system in the United States (Alexander, 2012; Baum, 1996; Cole, 1999). This is seen in the profession’s attire,
weaponry, security services in jails and prisons, other gadgets that help with
monitoring offenders who are involved with community supervision, the treatment
services that contract with the corrections industry, labs used for drug
testing, and collaboration with other law enforcement agencies (Alexander,
2012; Baum, 1996; Cole, 1999). Business
mentalities are also seen in the decisions by correction personnel in jails and
prisons and community supervision offices.
Such as, decisions are made to enhance their professionalism through
marketing of the profession as gatekeepers of safety for society, unionization
of employees, and collaboration between public and private establishments that
give advice to each other in order to maintain the wanted agenda of the
individuals who work in the industry (Alexander, 2012; Baum, 1996; Cole, 1999). More specifically, correctional managers and
their underlings are routinely engaging in discussions with community
correction practitioners, private companies, and other law enforcers to keep
the current system running at a rate that keeps individuals employed and of
importance to the criminal justice system and the public in a manner that is
wanted by the criminal justice professionals (Alexander, 2012; Baum, 1996;
Cole, 1999). The recidivism rates and
decisions about early release from prison are an example of this. Corrections personnel routinely communicate
with probation and parole departments, as well as prosecutors, judges, and
street-level law enforcers, to maintain a large population in jails and
prisons. In the private correctional
facilities, there are even formal contracts that are created that present
stipulations about percentages that must be met so that lay-offs and shutdowns
do not occur – which is an example of profit-seeking behaviors (Alexander,
2012; Baum, 1996; Cole, 1999).
The use of fines,
surcharges, and fees are another example of the industry-based mentalities of
correctional practitioners. Monetary
incentives are noticed by correctional staff, and the intake of money is one of
the major priorities of managers in the public and private correctional
entities in the United States. Ensuring
that a constant intake of money occurs allows correctional facilities/systems and its
employees to have funds to disperse when necessary as well as for collateral
and a base for business relationships to be established (Alexander, 2012; Baum,
1996; Bohm, 2006 Cole, 1999). Public and
private correction establishments work together so income is generated in other
words which, in turn, allow the practitioners in the industry to perform quid
pro quos so that employment and social relevance is maintained (Alexander,
2012; Baum, 1996; Cole, 1999).
Bargaining and negotiations can be developed simply on the income that
is generated by the corrections industry, that is.
The
Denouement
Commercialism
in the criminal justice system is driving most of its practices. Furthermore, there is a social stratification
that is intertwined with the legal system and also causes criminal justice
practices to be based on capitalistic schemes (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010;
Shantz, 2012). Efforts of justice and
injustice are put forth that are based on these social stratifications and
enjoyment of monetary incentives (Alexander, 2012; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz, 2012). Due process and ethical criminal justice
practices are hindered because of this which, in turn, causes harm to society
at large and any developments that may be configured to reform the criminal
justice system for the better. Citizens
and legal professionals are blatantly and passively participating in many
biases and, in many cases, authentic justice is missed because of the extended
duration of the commerce-based criminal justice apparatus in the United States (Alexander,
2012; Baum, 1996; Cole, 1999; Shantz, 2012).
Activism about the capitalism-entrenched justice system is viewed as odd
in many cases – by both the public and legal practitioners. Given the extended period of commerce-based
practices in the criminal justice system, coupled with the current trend of lethargy
by American citizens and criminal justice professionals about adequate public
service and smaller and fairer penal systems, the system will continue with the
prejudiced administration of justice until significant public blow-back is dispensed
and law enforcers adhere to the social cries and apply the law equally.
This transformation is something that will not occur quickly if the aforementioned public desires come about
because of the resistance from unionization in the criminal justice system. That is, internal agencies that makeup the
criminal justice system will fight augmentations that drastically reduce their
worth and so will the private entities who attach themselves to the system for
profits and wanted social reputations (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Shantz, 2012). Finally, political figures will embark on
processes that entail slandering positive changes simply because of campaign
reasons or ties to individuals and organizations who have supported them
financially or in other ways (Black, 2010; Baum, 1996). When the criminal justice system ends its reliance on profit-driven
mentalities, then the United States will see true justice coming to light. Which, in turn, will produce positive
thinking patterns about governmental bodies and those who work within the
public sector.
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