The Demagoguery of Federal and State Judges in the United States
Introduction: It’s All Fucked-Up!
Catering to farcical
governmental projections and participating in unconstitutional procedures are
troubling behaviors in judicial endeavors (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Pyle,
2002). The dual legal system in the
United States was designed so that the federal legal system served as an
oversight utility for uncanny behaviors and mediocre administrations of justice
(Pyle, 2002; Schmalleger, 2008).
Problems in this two-part legal system have become more abundant since
the effects of mass incarceration steadily increased and made its permanent footprint
in the American criminal justice system (Alexander, 2012; Church & Huemann,
1992; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Walker, 2011).
That is, federal courts have become mockeries of the Bill of Rights in
the United States’ Constitution and rarely participate in case oversight for
state-based legal matters. The majority
of oversight by the federal system that does occur includes authority over
serious issues that entail wrongful convictions for heinous crimes in state
courts or significant constitutional issues pertaining to capital punishment (Kraska
& Brent, 2011; Pyle, 2002; Simon, 2018).
Many cases are ignored
that do not rise to the aforementioned levels of significance, which in turn
defines the federal system as a caveat that only deals with issues that are
high-profile. These practices are
biased, and the provisions in the federal legal codes prohibit such behaviors
(Pyle, 2002; United States Courts, 2014).
Thus, the quandary of oversight for the federal legal system
arises. Nevertheless, the minimal aggressiveness
by the federal system over the state systems tends to be rooted in building
case law and convicting individuals within lower social classes (Alexander,
2012; Black, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Simon, 2018; Walker, 2011). Politically motivated amendments to the legal system have
stunted the evolution of the law for the good of itself and the public, and the
dual system appears to have transitioned into a tenement that is full of
practitioners who are inundated with cases that require efficiency for quick
finalization rather than observing the details so that actual justice is
undergone (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).
The second aspect of this
essay discusses how state and federal judges accommodate other law enforcers so
that a perverted sense of unity is maintained.
More specifically, judges in American society have turned against
fairness and impartiality in order to remain stable in their careers and backed
by practitioners who provide the social imagery that they (federal and state
judges) desire (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010).
That is, prosecutors, street-level law enforcers, and other
practitioners allow for the prosperity of jurists and turning against any of
these external law enforcers or other practitioners would hinder such professional goals of the
presiding judges (Black, 2010; Chun, Ames, Uribe, & Higgins, 2017; Griffin,
2017; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Lipsky, 2010).
Once a judge refuses to cater to the aforementioned parties, the
annexation process is initiated and judges receive flak from informal and
formal sources which, in turn, allows unwanted social images and perceptions to
slink into the judges’ livelihoods (Black, 2010; Chun et al., 2017; Lipsky,
2010). Thus, this essay will discuss the
general and specific demagoguery of state and federal judges in two facets. Specifically, the overall acquiescence of the
federal and state legal systems and how they are currently based on prejudiced
actions of criminal justice that adhere to mass incarceration policies and case
law generation, as well as the individual activities by federal and state
judges that occur so that disparaging behaviors toward jurists do not happen
within the culture of the legal system or outside of it.
We
Have to be Correct
Mass incarceration has a
stronghold on jurists in the United States (Alexander, 2012; Walker, 2011). The billions of dollars that have been
distributed to build correctional facilities have a secondary purpose for the nation. That is, the allocation of monies has
transitioned into millions of American citizens being employed directly or
indirectly with the criminal justice system (Alexander, 2012; Church &
Huemann, 1992; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Walker,
2011). Because of this, the criminal
justice system has become required to sustain the benefits that the millions of
people are receiving who are associated with it. State and federal judges have, essentially,
become concierges of prosperity for the previously mentioned individuals and
organizations that are linked to the criminal justice apparatus (Alexander,
2012; Church & Huemann, 1992; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Reiman &
Leighton, 2017; Walker, 2011). Their
roles are now a deliberate biased operation in other words. Posterior actions are performed in every
criminal court case in the United States, and the judges are not only
responsible for the lack of fairness and horrendous due processes but also the
collateral harms that radiate after such injustices are performed (Alexander,
2012; Church & Huemann, 1992; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Reiman &
Leighton, 2017; Walker, 2011). The
equanimity by the jurists in the United States is astonishing when their lack
of activism and blatant disregard of constitutional adherence is fully
examined. Efficiency in court procedures
– in respect to acquiring a conviction and term of imprisonment – are the arrangements
that jurists specialize in (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton,
2017).
Screwing
Over the Poor
Federal
and state judges treat poor people like criminals regardless of evidence and
required conduct in courtrooms.
Individuals who are not wealthy are also punished for invoking their
constitutional rights in federal and state courts by the judges (Alexander,
2012; Black, 2010; Bowers, 2008; Butler, 2013; Reiman & Leighton, 2017). Explicitly, judges become angered at
defendants who are outspoken, not afraid to remove poor defense attorneys from
their cases, and those who require the judges to make more decisions because of
motions or trial procedures (Alexander, 2012; Black, 2010; Reiman &
Leighton, 2017). The uncertainty of
prosecution, and amount of effort in a criminal case, has turned into a
justification for judges to punish poor defendants more severely if they choose
to challenge the criminal justice system’s efficiency tactics (Alexander, 2012;
Black, 2010; Bowers, 2008; Church & Huemann, 1992; Gross, 2013; Reiman
& Leighton, 2017). All of these
prejudices by federal and state judges come to light when one observes the
behaviors of judges during criminal matters.
Moreover, federal and state judges are aware that most poor defendants
do not have the resources to make judges appear biased or inept to the public
or other legal practitioners. This
knowledge allows the judges to act quite uncanny when presiding over a matter
that includes a poor defendant, which is a very common characteristic of criminal
defendants in the United States (Alexander, 2012; Black, 2010; Butler, 2013;
Reiman & Leighton, 2017).
No More Federal Oversight, Unless It
Makes Me Look Good
Reversals
of convictions that brought long-terms of imprisonment and constitutional
issues regarding capital punishment are the primary federal inquiries when its
authority is bestowed upon state courts (Pfander, 2007; United States Courts,
2018). Other than this, the federal
criminal courts mostly concentrate their attention to relatively minor criminal
offenses and, as mentioned above, purposely exacerbate the effects of mass
incarceration (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Walker, 2011). When federal judges catch wind of a case that
allows themselves to appear patriotic and diligent in their duties there is an
informal system that is initiated.
Explaining more, since federal judges cannot simply choose which cases
they want to preside over so that constitutional arguments ensue, they turn to
the legal community to bring them before them.
Attorneys are told to submit legal documents to the federal system so
that judges can make important decisions and look like legal experts or
saviors. It should be noted that
criminal defense attorneys in the federal system have to be admitted to
practice in the federal system and, because of this, the number of practicing
attorneys is far less than the number of practicing attorneys in the state
systems, which allows judges to hand-select lawyers who are apt to “play ball”
with the matters that federal judges want to participate in (Okray, 2016; Pyle,
2002).
Moreover, these serious
constitutional cases are not only being configured for the opulence of district
court judges. In other words, the entire
gamut of federal judges is able to benefit from the self-induced egotism. Appellate court judges and Supreme Court
judges generate legal opinions about these high-profile cases, which translates
into legal expertise, and also transitions into monetary compensation and
external judicial professionalism (CBS News, 2000; Mears, 2014; Pyle, 2002). This is seen with invitations to federal
judges to speak at law schools and conferences (CBS News, 2000; Mears, 2014). Both of which, at times, pay monetary sums
for these lectures and discussions and, in turn, transitions into future
capitalistic schemes for the federal judges and the aforementioned aspects of
respect in the legal community (CBS News; Mears, 2014). Similarly, other judicial professionals gain
credible experience because of the conceitedness of federal judges as
well. Specifically, prosecutors, law
clerks, defense attorneys, and academics are able to create professional
profiles for themselves because of the desires that federal judges seek out
(Prechtel-Kluskens, 1997; Nash, 2017).
Career advancement has a reciprocity because of the demagoguery of
federal judges, that is.
Focusing on the lack of
oversight toward state courts, and as aforementioned, federal judges rarely
take on cases that have constitutional problems when the identified criminality
is less severe and the punishments that offenders received are not life terms
of incarceration, or close to it, or capital punishment (Alexander, 2012;
Reiman & Leighton, 2017). The
sovereignty of states’ rights typically becomes relevant again when parties
attempt to make claims to a federal court about due process and constitutional
flaws by the state criminal justice systems when less severe criminal activity
is encompassed. State judges are aware
of this negligence by the federal jurists and, at times, will conduct
themselves in a fashion that allows for professional imagery to come about so
that they can also retain titles of public officiality without much dissent
from the public or legal community (Prechtel-Kluskens, 1997; Nash, 2017). With this being stated, state judges
routinely hide their prejudices and demagoguery through legitimate legal
processes, which makes oversight more difficult to be initiated if it was being
ensued. Curtailing their efforts toward
the prosecutors in cases that do not include heinous activities allows the
state judges to retain desired goals and maintain the efficiency of conviction
rates so that external and internal associations are not hindered (Prechtel-Kluskens,
1997; Nash, 2017; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).
Withal, federal courts
and state courts work together to maintain courtroom efficiency in both sectors,
the high percentage of conviction rates for the established mass incarceration,
and desired social images for each other (Alexander, 2012; Reiman &
Leighton, 2017). More precisely, the
cooperation brings friendships between state and federal judges and other
courtroom personnel. Federal oversight
of the state courts now simply includes information about which cases can be
transferred to the federal system so that the stronger penalties can be
achieved which, in turn, lessens the burdens for state courts and assists
federal judges in maintaining a full docket (Kraska & Brent, 2011; Reiman
& Leighton, 2017). This connection
is also synonymous with courtroom efficiency and the aforementioned social
perception desires by both sets of judges (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Pyle,
2002). In some cases, dual prosecutions
are delivered so that a shared judicial prosperity is acquired. Defendants, in some cases, are prosecuted in
both legal systems in other words (Butler, 2013; Pyle, 2002; Schmalleger, 2008).
Pleasing the Law Enforcers and Other
Personnel With Guilty Pleasures
Federal
and state judges take oaths to uphold the law and preside over legal matters in
a fair and impartial way (Pyle, 2002; Schmalleger, 2008). This is the formal description of what they
are responsible for. However, there is
also a secondary purpose that is informal and mitigates judges’ behaviors and
these behaviors are applied more often when compared to the written agendas and
policies that the Office of Administration, Department of Justice,
and similar state-based organizations produce.
That is, federal and state judges rely on street-level law enforcers for
public imagery and legal matters (Black, 2010; Chambliss, 1978; Lipsky, 2010;
Reiman & Leighton, 2017). Without
federal agents or state-based police officers generating cases and arrests,
there would be few criminal matters that judges are responsible for overseeing
(Lipsky, 2010; Skoll, 2009). Because of
this, judges have an informal homage that they are required to participate
in. Dismissing charges, denying
prosecutors’ claims, and rendering investigations useless has a terrible impact
on desired understandings of law and order in the United States, especially for
federal judges and federal police officers (Church & Huemann, 1992; Lipsky,
2010; Skoll, 2009). If judges were
actually fair and impartial, as well as individuals who ensure that
constitutional rights were not violated during the course of a criminal
investigation or prosecution, there would be far less convictions which, in turn,
transitions into far less people in correctional facilities (Church &
Huemann, 1992; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017). These processes would also allow criminal
conduct to go unchecked or deterred in some cases. Federal and state law enforcement agencies
would also deal with many internal and external matters that present them as
incompetent beings if this were the case.
Of this, federal and state judges also
consider the corrections industry, criminal defense attorneys in the community,
prosecutors’ offices, and the other occupations that are centered on the criminal
justice system when presiding over criminal matters (Alexander, 2012; Lipsky,
2010; Skoll, 2009). An exuberant amount
of money has been administered to employ citizens and give them professional
livelihoods that, in turn, allow for the “American Dream” to be pursued or
lived (Alexander, 2012; Lipsky, 2010; Skoll, 20090. If there were less cases, fewer prosecutions,
and fewer convictions, the many citizens who rely on the criminal justice system for
employment would not be necessary.
Again, mass incarceration has produced benefits to individuals in middle
and upper social classes (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017). Employment and individual worth, that is. Federal and state judges cater to botched
police work and malicious prosecutions so that more problems for the legal
system do not persist as well (Lipsky, 2010; Skoll, 2009). More specifically, if judges do not rule in
the favor of law enforcers they would be essentially setting the framework for
civil lawsuits and internal sanctions in law enforcement organizations. Rewarding offenders would be a byproduct if more authentic justice was undergone.
Conclusion: Blatant Sucking
Demagoguery
and righteousness in direct and indirect fashions are the primary functions of
federal and state judges in contemporary society (Berkowitz, 2003; Lipsky,
2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017). Catering
to law enforcers and other legal practitioners ensures that judges are worthy
of their positions and not enemies of those who rely on the criminal laws for
occupations and social and individual perceptions (Berkowitz, 2003; Skoll,
2009). Overseeing due process and constitutional
issues in criminal matters is a secondary purpose for federal and state judges
and federal and state courts in general (Berkowitz, 2003; Skoll, 2009). These activities have uprooted the entire
premise of the entire judiciary in the United States, and mass incarceration is
one of the main variables for such behaviors by federal and state judges
(Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).
Individuals in lower social classes are the ones being exploited for the
aforementioned desires in most cases (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton,
2017). Federal and state judges rarely
admonish or partake in judicial endeavors that deem social elites as criminal
or deviant in their behaviors, and if they are performed, the judicial
conveyances are minor applications of negative labels when compared to the
defendants who are less fortunate (Black, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017;
Skoll, 2009).
An
unusual silence about the obvious prejudices of federal and state judges by the
other legal practitioners also seems to be abundant. This is most likely attributed to
professional desires, engagements in capitalism, and fear of retaliation that
may occur if any outspoken actions are undergone, which are similar tendencies
for the flagrant biases that the federal and state judges participate in
(Berkowitz, 2003; Skoll, 2009). With
this being stated, it also plausible to suggest that timid and indentured
individuals are deliberately hired in the federal and state criminal justice
systems. Mass incarceration is both the
causation and result of these behaviors, and federal and state judges are
responsible for millions of miscarriages of justice in the United States
(Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).
Since no oversight institutions exist in the federal system – none that are
authentic and able to sanction federal judges or other legal practitioners –
these prejudices and poor legal methods will continue in this specific system. Finally, since there is a similar goal in
state-based systems, the behaviors by state judges go unchecked as well, unless
an instance occurs that allows for the prosperity of federal jurists. There is a symbiosis until an act occurs that can make the federal practitioners appear diligent in legal matters.
References
---- (2000, September 22). Federal judges want speaking fees. CBS
News. Retrieved from
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/federal-judges-want-speaking-fees/.
---- (2014).
Code of conduct for United States judges. Uscourts.gov. Retrieved from
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch02_0.pdf.
---- (2018).
Court role and structure. Uscourts.gov. Retrieved from
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure.
Alexander, M.
(2012). The new Jim Crow: Mass
incarceration in the age of colorblindness.
New
York: The New Press.
Berkowitz, P.
(2003). The demagoguery of
democratic theory. Astoria, 15(1-2), 123-145.
Black, D.
(2010). The behavior of law: Special
edition. United Kingdom: Emerald.
Bowers, J.
(2008). Punishing the
innocent. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 156(5),
1117-1179.
Butler, P. D.
(2013). Poor people lose: Gideon and the critique of rights. The Yale
Law
Journal, 122(8),
2176.
Chambliss, W.
(1978). On the take: From petty crooks
to presidents (2nd ed.).
Bloomington,
ID: Indiana University Press.
Chun, J. S., Ames, D. R., Uribe, J. N., & Higgins,
E. T. (2017). Who do we think of as good
judges? Those who agree with us about us. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology,
69,
121-129.
Church, T. W., & Heumann, M. (1992).
Speedy disposition: Monetary incentives and policy
reform
in criminal courts. Albany,
New York: State University of New York
Press.
Griffin, L. K.
(2017). State incentives, plea
bargaining, regulation, and the failed market for
indigent
defense. Law & Contemporary Problems, 80(1), 83-105.
Gross, J. P.
(2013). Too poor to hire a lawyer but not indigent: How states use the federal
poverty guidelines to deprive
defendants of their sixth amendment right to counsel.
Washington
and Lee Law Review, 70(2), 1173-1219.
Kraska, P. B., & Brent, J. J. (2011).
Theorizing criminal justice: Eight essential orientations
(2nd
ed.). Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
Lipsky, M.
(2010). Street-level bureaucracy:
Dilemmas of the individual in public services.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Okray, J. (2016,
September). Attorney admission practices
in the U.S. federal courts. The
Federal
Lawyer, 40-47.
Retrieved from http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-
Lawyer-Magazine/2016/September/Attorney-Admission-Practices-in-the-US-Federal-
Courts.aspx?FT=.pdf.
Mears, B.
(2014, June 20). Supreme court
justices: They do OK financially. CNN
Politics.
Retrieved
from https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/20/politics/supreme-court-pay/index.html.
Nash, J. R.
(2017). Judicial laterals. Vanderbilt
Law Review, 70(6), 1911-1933.
Pfander, J. E.
(2007). Federal supremacy, state
court inferiority, and the constitutionality of
jurisdiction-stripping
legislation. Northwestern University Law Review, 101(1), 1-48.
Prechtel-Kluskens, C.
(1997). The lives and careers of judges and other
employees in the
federal judicial system: Some pointers on research. Western
Legal History, 10(1-2),
59.
Pyle, R. C.
(2002). Foundations of law: Cases,
commentary & ethics (3rd ed.). Albany, NY:
West
Legal Studies.
Reiman, J., & Leighton, P. (2017).
The rich get richer and the poor
get prison: Ideology, class
and criminal justice (11th
ed.). New York: Routledge.
Schmalleger, F.
(2008). Criminal justice: A brief
introduction (7th ed.).
Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Simon, J.
(2018). Penal monitoring in the
United States: Lessons from the American
experience and prospects
for change. Crime, Law and Social Change, 70(1), 161-173.
Skoll, G.
(2009). Contemporary criminology and criminal justice theory: Evaluating justice
systems in capitalist societies. United States: Palgrave Macmillan.
Walker, S.
(2011). Sense and non-sense about crime, drugs, and communities (7th
ed.).
Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth. 
Photo Credit: Benjamin J. Bolton
Comments
Post a Comment