The Demagoguery of Federal and State Judges in the United States

Introduction:  It’s All Fucked-Up!

Catering to farcical governmental projections and participating in unconstitutional procedures are troubling behaviors in judicial endeavors (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Pyle, 2002).  The dual legal system in the United States was designed so that the federal legal system served as an oversight utility for uncanny behaviors and mediocre administrations of justice (Pyle, 2002; Schmalleger, 2008).  Problems in this two-part legal system have become more abundant since the effects of mass incarceration steadily increased and made its permanent footprint in the American criminal justice system (Alexander, 2012; Church & Huemann, 1992; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Walker, 2011).  That is, federal courts have become mockeries of the Bill of Rights in the United States’ Constitution and rarely participate in case oversight for state-based legal matters.  The majority of oversight by the federal system that does occur includes authority over serious issues that entail wrongful convictions for heinous crimes in state courts or significant constitutional issues pertaining to capital punishment (Kraska & Brent, 2011; Pyle, 2002; Simon, 2018). 

Many cases are ignored that do not rise to the aforementioned levels of significance, which in turn defines the federal system as a caveat that only deals with issues that are high-profile.  These practices are biased, and the provisions in the federal legal codes prohibit such behaviors (Pyle, 2002; United States Courts, 2014).  Thus, the quandary of oversight for the federal legal system arises.  Nevertheless, the minimal aggressiveness by the federal system over the state systems tends to be rooted in building case law and convicting individuals within lower social classes (Alexander, 2012; Black, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Simon, 2018; Walker, 2011).  Politically motivated amendments to the legal system have stunted the evolution of the law for the good of itself and the public, and the dual system appears to have transitioned into a tenement that is full of practitioners who are inundated with cases that require efficiency for quick finalization rather than observing the details so that actual justice is undergone (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017). 

The second aspect of this essay discusses how state and federal judges accommodate other law enforcers so that a perverted sense of unity is maintained.  More specifically, judges in American society have turned against fairness and impartiality in order to remain stable in their careers and backed by practitioners who provide the social imagery that they (federal and state judges) desire (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010).  That is, prosecutors, street-level law enforcers, and other practitioners allow for the prosperity of jurists and turning against any of these external law enforcers or other practitioners would hinder such professional goals of the presiding judges (Black, 2010; Chun, Ames, Uribe, & Higgins, 2017; Griffin, 2017; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Lipsky, 2010).  Once a judge refuses to cater to the aforementioned parties, the annexation process is initiated and judges receive flak from informal and formal sources which, in turn, allows unwanted social images and perceptions to slink into the judges’ livelihoods (Black, 2010; Chun et al., 2017; Lipsky, 2010).  Thus, this essay will discuss the general and specific demagoguery of state and federal judges in two facets.  Specifically, the overall acquiescence of the federal and state legal systems and how they are currently based on prejudiced actions of criminal justice that adhere to mass incarceration policies and case law generation, as well as the individual activities by federal and state judges that occur so that disparaging behaviors toward jurists do not happen within the culture of the legal system or outside of it.

We Have to be Correct

Mass incarceration has a stronghold on jurists in the United States (Alexander, 2012; Walker, 2011).  The billions of dollars that have been distributed to build correctional facilities have a secondary purpose for the nation.  That is, the allocation of monies has transitioned into millions of American citizens being employed directly or indirectly with the criminal justice system (Alexander, 2012; Church & Huemann, 1992; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Walker, 2011).  Because of this, the criminal justice system has become required to sustain the benefits that the millions of people are receiving who are associated with it.  State and federal judges have, essentially, become concierges of prosperity for the previously mentioned individuals and organizations that are linked to the criminal justice apparatus (Alexander, 2012; Church & Huemann, 1992; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Walker, 2011).  Their roles are now a deliberate biased operation in other words.  Posterior actions are performed in every criminal court case in the United States, and the judges are not only responsible for the lack of fairness and horrendous due processes but also the collateral harms that radiate after such injustices are performed (Alexander, 2012; Church & Huemann, 1992; Kraska & Brent, 2011; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Walker, 2011).  The equanimity by the jurists in the United States is astonishing when their lack of activism and blatant disregard of constitutional adherence is fully examined.  Efficiency in court procedures – in respect to acquiring a conviction and term of imprisonment – are the arrangements that jurists specialize in (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).

Screwing Over the Poor

            

           Federal and state judges treat poor people like criminals regardless of evidence and required conduct in courtrooms.  Individuals who are not wealthy are also punished for invoking their constitutional rights in federal and state courts by the judges (Alexander, 2012; Black, 2010; Bowers, 2008; Butler, 2013; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  Explicitly, judges become angered at defendants who are outspoken, not afraid to remove poor defense attorneys from their cases, and those who require the judges to make more decisions because of motions or trial procedures (Alexander, 2012; Black, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  The uncertainty of prosecution, and amount of effort in a criminal case, has turned into a justification for judges to punish poor defendants more severely if they choose to challenge the criminal justice system’s efficiency tactics (Alexander, 2012; Black, 2010; Bowers, 2008; Church & Huemann, 1992; Gross, 2013; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  All of these prejudices by federal and state judges come to light when one observes the behaviors of judges during criminal matters.  Moreover, federal and state judges are aware that most poor defendants do not have the resources to make judges appear biased or inept to the public or other legal practitioners.  This knowledge allows the judges to act quite uncanny when presiding over a matter that includes a poor defendant, which is a very common characteristic of criminal defendants in the United States (Alexander, 2012; Black, 2010; Butler, 2013; Reiman & Leighton, 2017). 

         

No More Federal Oversight, Unless It Makes Me Look Good

            

              Reversals of convictions that brought long-terms of imprisonment and constitutional issues regarding capital punishment are the primary federal inquiries when its authority is bestowed upon state courts (Pfander, 2007; United States Courts, 2018).  Other than this, the federal criminal courts mostly concentrate their attention to relatively minor criminal offenses and, as mentioned above, purposely exacerbate the effects of mass incarceration (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Walker, 2011).  When federal judges catch wind of a case that allows themselves to appear patriotic and diligent in their duties there is an informal system that is initiated.  Explaining more, since federal judges cannot simply choose which cases they want to preside over so that constitutional arguments ensue, they turn to the legal community to bring them before them.  Attorneys are told to submit legal documents to the federal system so that judges can make important decisions and look like legal experts or saviors.  It should be noted that criminal defense attorneys in the federal system have to be admitted to practice in the federal system and, because of this, the number of practicing attorneys is far less than the number of practicing attorneys in the state systems, which allows judges to hand-select lawyers who are apt to “play ball” with the matters that federal judges want to participate in (Okray, 2016; Pyle, 2002). 

Moreover, these serious constitutional cases are not only being configured for the opulence of district court judges.  In other words, the entire gamut of federal judges is able to benefit from the self-induced egotism.  Appellate court judges and Supreme Court judges generate legal opinions about these high-profile cases, which translates into legal expertise, and also transitions into monetary compensation and external judicial professionalism (CBS News, 2000; Mears, 2014; Pyle, 2002).  This is seen with invitations to federal judges to speak at law schools and conferences (CBS News, 2000; Mears, 2014).  Both of which, at times, pay monetary sums for these lectures and discussions and, in turn, transitions into future capitalistic schemes for the federal judges and the aforementioned aspects of respect in the legal community (CBS News; Mears, 2014).  Similarly, other judicial professionals gain credible experience because of the conceitedness of federal judges as well.  Specifically, prosecutors, law clerks, defense attorneys, and academics are able to create professional profiles for themselves because of the desires that federal judges seek out (Prechtel-Kluskens, 1997; Nash, 2017).  Career advancement has a reciprocity because of the demagoguery of federal judges, that is. 
 

Focusing on the lack of oversight toward state courts, and as aforementioned, federal judges rarely take on cases that have constitutional problems when the identified criminality is less severe and the punishments that offenders received are not life terms of incarceration, or close to it, or capital punishment (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  The sovereignty of states’ rights typically becomes relevant again when parties attempt to make claims to a federal court about due process and constitutional flaws by the state criminal justice systems when less severe criminal activity is encompassed.  State judges are aware of this negligence by the federal jurists and, at times, will conduct themselves in a fashion that allows for professional imagery to come about so that they can also retain titles of public officiality without much dissent from the public or legal community (Prechtel-Kluskens, 1997; Nash, 2017).  With this being stated, state judges routinely hide their prejudices and demagoguery through legitimate legal processes, which makes oversight more difficult to be initiated if it was being ensued.  Curtailing their efforts toward the prosecutors in cases that do not include heinous activities allows the state judges to retain desired goals and maintain the efficiency of conviction rates so that external and internal associations are not hindered (Prechtel-Kluskens, 1997; Nash, 2017; Reiman & Leighton, 2017). 

Withal, federal courts and state courts work together to maintain courtroom efficiency in both sectors, the high percentage of conviction rates for the established mass incarceration, and desired social images for each other (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  More precisely, the cooperation brings friendships between state and federal judges and other courtroom personnel.  Federal oversight of the state courts now simply includes information about which cases can be transferred to the federal system so that the stronger penalties can be achieved which, in turn, lessens the burdens for state courts and assists federal judges in maintaining a full docket (Kraska & Brent, 2011; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  This connection is also synonymous with courtroom efficiency and the aforementioned social perception desires by both sets of judges (Black, 2010; Lipsky, 2010; Pyle, 2002).  In some cases, dual prosecutions are delivered so that a shared judicial prosperity is acquired.  Defendants, in some cases, are prosecuted in both legal systems in other words (Butler, 2013; Pyle, 2002; Schmalleger, 2008).

Pleasing the Law Enforcers and Other Personnel With Guilty Pleasures

            

              Federal and state judges take oaths to uphold the law and preside over legal matters in a fair and impartial way (Pyle, 2002; Schmalleger, 2008).  This is the formal description of what they are responsible for.  However, there is also a secondary purpose that is informal and mitigates judges’ behaviors and these behaviors are applied more often when compared to the written agendas and policies that the Office of Administration, Department of Justice, and similar state-based organizations produce.  That is, federal and state judges rely on street-level law enforcers for public imagery and legal matters (Black, 2010; Chambliss, 1978; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  Without federal agents or state-based police officers generating cases and arrests, there would be few criminal matters that judges are responsible for overseeing (Lipsky, 2010; Skoll, 2009).  Because of this, judges have an informal homage that they are required to participate in.  Dismissing charges, denying prosecutors’ claims, and rendering investigations useless has a terrible impact on desired understandings of law and order in the United States, especially for federal judges and federal police officers (Church & Huemann, 1992; Lipsky, 2010; Skoll, 2009).  If judges were actually fair and impartial, as well as individuals who ensure that constitutional rights were not violated during the course of a criminal investigation or prosecution, there would be far less convictions which, in turn, transitions into far less people in correctional facilities (Church & Huemann, 1992; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  These processes would also allow criminal conduct to go unchecked or deterred in some cases.  Federal and state law enforcement agencies would also deal with many internal and external matters that present them as incompetent beings if this were the case.   

              Of this, federal and state judges also consider the corrections industry, criminal defense attorneys in the community, prosecutors’ offices, and the other occupations that are centered on the criminal justice system when presiding over criminal matters (Alexander, 2012; Lipsky, 2010; Skoll, 2009).  An exuberant amount of money has been administered to employ citizens and give them professional livelihoods that, in turn, allow for the “American Dream” to be pursued or lived (Alexander, 2012; Lipsky, 2010; Skoll, 20090.  If there were less cases, fewer prosecutions, and fewer convictions, the many citizens who rely on the criminal justice system for employment would not be necessary.  Again, mass incarceration has produced benefits to individuals in middle and upper social classes (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  Employment and individual worth, that is.  Federal and state judges cater to botched police work and malicious prosecutions so that more problems for the legal system do not persist as well (Lipsky, 2010; Skoll, 2009).  More specifically, if judges do not rule in the favor of law enforcers they would be essentially setting the framework for civil lawsuits and internal sanctions in law enforcement organizations.  Rewarding offenders would be a byproduct if more authentic justice was undergone.    

Conclusion:  Blatant Sucking

            

            Demagoguery and righteousness in direct and indirect fashions are the primary functions of federal and state judges in contemporary society (Berkowitz, 2003; Lipsky, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  Catering to law enforcers and other legal practitioners ensures that judges are worthy of their positions and not enemies of those who rely on the criminal laws for occupations and social and individual perceptions (Berkowitz, 2003; Skoll, 2009).  Overseeing due process and constitutional issues in criminal matters is a secondary purpose for federal and state judges and federal and state courts in general (Berkowitz, 2003; Skoll, 2009).  These activities have uprooted the entire premise of the entire judiciary in the United States, and mass incarceration is one of the main variables for such behaviors by federal and state judges (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  Individuals in lower social classes are the ones being exploited for the aforementioned desires in most cases (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  Federal and state judges rarely admonish or partake in judicial endeavors that deem social elites as criminal or deviant in their behaviors, and if they are performed, the judicial conveyances are minor applications of negative labels when compared to the defendants who are less fortunate (Black, 2010; Reiman & Leighton, 2017; Skoll, 2009).

 

            An unusual silence about the obvious prejudices of federal and state judges by the other legal practitioners also seems to be abundant.  This is most likely attributed to professional desires, engagements in capitalism, and fear of retaliation that may occur if any outspoken actions are undergone, which are similar tendencies for the flagrant biases that the federal and state judges participate in (Berkowitz, 2003; Skoll, 2009).  With this being stated, it also plausible to suggest that timid and indentured individuals are deliberately hired in the federal and state criminal justice systems.  Mass incarceration is both the causation and result of these behaviors, and federal and state judges are responsible for millions of miscarriages of justice in the United States (Alexander, 2012; Reiman & Leighton, 2017).  Since no oversight institutions exist in the federal system – none that are authentic and able to sanction federal judges or other legal practitioners – these prejudices and poor legal methods will continue in this specific system.  Finally, since there is a similar goal in state-based systems, the behaviors by state judges go unchecked as well, unless an instance occurs that allows for the prosperity of federal jurists.  There is a symbiosis until an act occurs that can make the federal practitioners appear diligent in legal matters.  

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Photo Credit:  Benjamin J. Bolton